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 International Green House Gas negotiations have foundered on the need to allocate caps.
 A small carbon tax is a more achievable policy than the global cooperation needed for caps.
 A small carbon tax among cooperating nations can fund much more energy research and development.
 Access to advanced technology creates a relatively low cost incentive to cooperate.
 Lower cost energy services, if achieved, would improve human welfare
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a b s t r a c t
This paper proposes a new Green House Gas policy building upon general consensus in scientiﬁc,
political and economic communities including:
1. Concern too little progress is being made toward an integrated global approach to controlling CO2
emissions.
2. Recommendation of a carbon tax.
3. Need for increased R&D for alternative energy sources.
4. Substantially increased research and development expenditures are relatively inexpensive.
Here,these elements are woven into a coherent strategy that should be farmore politically acceptable
by global governments than currentalternatives. Here are its elements:
1. A small carbon tax whose proceeds are tied exclusively to energy research and development in a
dedicated trust fund.
2. Deployment of the fund to demonstrate beneﬁts of the approach and its incentives for other countries
to join.
3. The establishment of a commonality of interest among participating nations.
4. Clear incentives for additional nations to participate.
The ultimate goal, energy services at lower cost than today with fossil fuels, is appropriately
ambitious. The proposed approach is functional, timely and will produce beneﬁts going well beyond
simply stemming global warming. It would also tend to obviate the need for implementation policy:
economic choice would lead to transition to such new technologies.
& 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
1.1. A climate change policy
Current circumstances of climate science may permit a reconsi-
deration of direction for existing policy efforts related to global
warming issues. This paper presents a plan that provides an achievable
path toward a global policy on Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. At
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the heart of it is a small carbon tax (actually a GHG tax). The proceeds
of that tax are to be used strategically to provide stable, long term
support of a broad based research and development effort focused on
energy sources, energy use, and emission mitigation.
Over the last 15 years, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) sanctioned global warming predictions have sig-
niﬁcantly overestimated global warming. Those predictions sup-
ported much of the effort of the last 20 years to effect a global
policy regarding warming. A slower warming rate suggests that
the problem is less urgent and allows more time to develop
mitigation strategies and explore new approaches. This circum-
stance seems to be settling into the informed public arena, that is,
those who distinguish between science and public policy. The
point is that recent warming trend “is not a crisis for climate
science. This is just the way science goes (Houston, 2013).”
Although not as dire as predicted, underlying climate funda-
mentals indicate some action could be needed. It should be pointed
out, though, that dire warnings have not ceased. As of this writing, in
March, 2014, the IPCC just released a new report asserting that
“climate change could drive turbulence and conﬂict, prompted by
migration from newly uninhabitable areas and jockeying for water
and food.” According to the Christian Science Monitor, IPCC chair-
man Raiendra Pachauri said: “We have assessed impacts as they are
happening on natural and human systems on all continents. In view
of these impacts, and those that we have projected for the future,
nobody on this planet is going to be untouched by the impacts of
climate change.” (Spotts, 2014) Dire, indeed.
Throughout this paper I will try to be neutral as to how urgent a
global warming problem is. The scenarios, after all, do differ and
although they are outside the scope of this paper, it is reasonable to
conclude there is at least ample evidence for real concern. Extremely
credible people are on both sides of the issue and a prudent course
in the face of this uncertainty is to take some action. Moreover, the
fact that carbon dioxide is a GHG is indisputable.
2. Methods
2.1. Analysis of existing cap and trade shortcomings
Proponents of achieving large reductions in emissions in the
near term have embraced global cap and trade approaches. “Cap
and trade” refers to an environmental policy tool whereby “caps”
or limits are set on the amount of a pollutant that can be emitted.
The limit is usually set by governments or some other central
authority. Organizations that emit the speciﬁc pollutant are then
granted or sold permits which allow them to discharge pollutants
in the amount of their permit. Firms that have reduced emissions
below their “cap” are permitted to “trade” or sell permits to other
ﬁrms. The level of emissions dictated by the cap is almost always
lower than existing emissions and is reduced over time.
The European effort and the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme cap and trade system have virtually collapsed. Similarly,
the international treaty negotiations, last occurring in Copenha-
gen, are making little progress. The global consensus, critical to
such a treaty, failed as the developing world argued that they
would not sacriﬁce economic growth for environmental policy.
The international meetings, ﬁrst at Rio and then Kyoto, set
ambitious goals for carbon reduction and sought to allocate “allowed
emissions” by country or group. This was an extremely difﬁcult policy
to pursue and, as many predicted, has basically proven to be a failure.
The dynamic of the failure was quite simple. Allocating emissions
amounts to a division of a pot of value. Every participating entity has
a strong incentive to make a case for more than a proportionate
share of the allocation. Thus, the demands for allocations stand in
the way of moving forward (Helm, 2012).
One compromise is to simply over allocate, as has occurred in the
European Union which did institute a cap and trade system.
Consequently, traded allowances have fallen to near zero prices
and carbon emissions have increased. Even this softened approach is
not close to being adopted by the US and China, the world's two
largest emitters.
Cap and trade has arguably been successful in the US with
regard to sulfur oxide (SOX) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions.
Prices for those allowances have also fallen dramatically, but only
after years of emissions reductions.
However, the situation there is quite different than that con-
fronting any global warming policy. The US federal government,
through the EPA, provides an overriding authority that can
establish binding caps by force of law, and can govern to ensure
the integrity of the trading. No such authority exists at an
international level, and achieving such is a far bridge.
3. Results
3.1. A new approach
In the face of these disappointments, a new approach is
necessary. The approach I describe is incremental, transparent
and offers readily apparent incentives for global participation.
Moreover, the timing for a new policy approach may be right.
Although urgent global warming initiatives are viewed with
skepticism, a middle path that avoids the economic risk of cap
and trade systems while putting into place serious research and
development initiatives, demonstrates clear beneﬁts and, impor-
tantly, creates a structure that can evolve may be acceptable to
skeptical, but uneasy, political leaders and their supporters.
Even a small tax among a few Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) nations would provide ample
funds to provide stable ﬁnancing of research and development
into non carbon energy alternatives.
The best, albeit extremely difﬁcult solution to atmospheric
carbon problems which are not just limited to warming, is to ﬁnd
and develop less expensive non carbon energy sources to underlie
our modern economies, use less energy to provide our services,
and ﬁnd ways to prevent or recover GHG's from the air.
Heretofore, such programs and the levels of their funding have
been impacted by political winds. A dedicated effort with secure
funding and scientiﬁcally administered is the most efﬁcacious
approach to achieving the goal of science based research and
development to create better energy alternatives.
In its 2012 Global Energy Assessment Report, The International
Institute for Applied System Analysis calls for a much more inter-
nationally coordinated and planned effort for governing research and
development, which it terms the “Energy Technology Innovation
System (Grubler et al., 2012).” A source of dedicated funding from
an expanding group of cooperating nations would grow and would
help foment such an effort. Note also that an initial modest tax implies
that the funding could also grow by increasing the tax only slightly.
This approach I suggest has the beneﬁt of putting in place a
policy framework that would allow more stringent action if and
when the case for damages from warming becomes stronger (as
many climate scientists view as a certainty).
4. Discussion
4.1. Carbon tax fundamentals
The economist's logic for a carbon tax (or any externalities tax)
starts with the premise that increasing carbon dioxide concentration
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in the atmosphere causes warming; the physics of this are fairly
(though not entirely) incontrovertible. Continued warming will risk
substantial harm to ecosystems and the world economy. Carbon
concentration increases may have other adverse impacts on ocean
Ph (acidity) and other effects.
A carbon tax can theoretically create a net gain to world society
over the long term as it provides an incentive to reduce emissions
directly and encourages the search for alternatives to carbon
energy (Helm, 2012). These actions impose a cost to the economy,
but that cost is more than offset by reduced harm based on wise
policy.
There is also the matter of revenues collected by governments
through the tax. George Schultz and Gary Becker recently offered
support to a long standing proposal for “revenue neutrality” that
involves returning the funds to taxpayers (by a formula unrelated
to their use of carbon fuels) (Schultz and Becker, 2013). This is
offered as a means of making a carbon tax more palatable to
citizens.
In considering these and like proposals, one should clearly
understand that despite such a return of funds, today's consumers
are not better off. The higher costs they will bear for energy
directly, and the products that require energy to be produced
(virtually everything), is greater than the rebate they will receive
in total, though there might be some short term gainers. The
beneﬁts that more than offset the cost of carbon reduction will
accrue to future generations who will be spared some global
warming harm and who will be the beneﬁciaries of new energy
technologies.
In any case, for a carbon tax to make sense, those likely beneﬁts
must exceed probable costs. This cost beneﬁt analysis goes to the
heart of the debate over estimates of harm from warming and the
timing of that harm. The further in the future we might expect
harm, the less those damages should be weighed in current policy.
That is one big reason why the recent ﬂattening of future global
temperature estimates matter. The case for urgent climate change
action depends not on current temperature levels but rather that
temperature and other impacts that are expected for the future.
4.2. A coherent strategy is needed
Creating an effective, and by necessity, multinational approach
to the global warming problem, must ﬁrst be viewed for what it is:
a monumental task in scope and size. Such a collaborative effort is
unprecedented. It ultimately demands participation by every
signiﬁcant economic player in a game that will be costly. This
perspective is appropriately daunting,and, as has been shown, the
approach is so daunting that to date no uniﬁed global approach
has been successful.
Thus, a better strategy may be to begin with small simple steps
with as much clarity as possible.
Implementing a small carbon tax ($2/ton, arbitrarily) would be
relatively simple. Inventories of greenhouse gases already exist. A
small tax has very limited economic consequences to hinder its
adoption.
Some will argue that it is a “camel's nose under the tent.” But
that is exactly the point: we are far from sure we will not need the
camel in the tent even if unpleasant. Moreover, the twin objective
is to develop alternative energy sources, an objective that is
endorsed by both global “warmers” and “deniers.” In terms of
beneﬁt cost fundamentals, the costs imposed by the tax are, in a
probabilistic sense, outweighed by even a very small chance of
dire warming consequences being realized and we would gain
valuable experience by implementing the program.
There are a number of signiﬁcant greenhouse gases in addition
to CO2. The tax should equivalently apply to all to the extent
administratively possible. The $2 is entirely hypothetical. The
actual level should be set with some notion of the level of funding
for indicated research that might be sensible.
Of course, such a small tax would provide little incentive to
reduce carbon emissions (Nordhaus, 2008). The key gain is in the
strategic use of the proceeds of the tax. In terms of the US dollars
spent on energy, it is tiny, but applied to energy research and
development and warming research expenditure, it is huge. The US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates 5376.9 metric
tons of GHG emissions for 2012 in CO2 equivalents. Converting to
US tons, this is 5927.0 t. At $2 per ton this yields $12 billion
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2014). This compares to current
estimated global expenditures on research, development and
deployment of U.S. $50 billion (Grubler et al., 2012).
The Global Energy Assessment, in fact, makes the point that
current research and development may be underfunded. “Accord-
ing to one analysis of the US private sector using data from the
National Science Foundation's annual survey of companies, private
sector economically targeted investments (ETI) fell approximately
20% during 1994–2004. The US electricity sector's R&D arm, the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), saw its budget decline by a
factor of three during that time period (Nemet and Kammen, 2007).
Also, companies are far more likely to invest in short-term R&D
projects that are likely to bear fruit in the near term than to invest
in longer term, more fundamental R&D (Grubler et al., 2012).”
Important as well, if these revenues were dedicated to a “trust
fund” separately administered for this purpose, it would create a
stable source of funding for this activity (Helm, 2012). As I noted
earlier, energy R&D has been notable for rising and falling with
political winds and the political popularity of speciﬁc projects.
The tax revenues and trust fund should be thought of as
incremental to existing efforts and expenditure. Unwinding exist-
ing “entitlements” (to be perhaps unduly pejorative) would place a
dysfunctional obstacle in the way of adopting the program.
Incorporating existing programs whole hog would likely politicize
the trust fund at its inception. Ultimately, efforts could be
harmonized by raising the tax slightly and permitting those
involved with existing efforts to submit follow on proposals to
the trust fund governance.
Just a few countries agreeing to impose such a tax would
effectively get things started. The proper goal of such energy R&D
is to ﬁnd alternative means of providing energy services at lower
cost than today without potential global warming impacts. Also,
note that this speciﬁc goal should be politically palatable even to
the most fervent “deniers.” That is, energy services at a lower cost
is a goal that is acceptable, even desirable, across all political
spectrums.
A tax coalition of a few countries, or even one, could, with
ample funds, pursue that goal with much greater alacrity than has
ever been done before.
Energy has been called the “master resource” because it is so
critical to our modern economies and their continued growth. As
and if the cooperating countries' R&D efforts begin to achieve the
energy cost goals, they can potentially reap huge beneﬁts. Sharing
those beneﬁts should be a condition of tax coalition participation.
Such beneﬁts create an incentive for more nations to join in.
Further, to the extent the coalition becomes larger, the scope of
research can become broader and deeper. The analogy here is to
inventors and entrepreneurs capturing the beneﬁts of their inno-
vations. Coalition nations should so beneﬁt.
The incentives built into this proposal stand in stark contrast to
the policies that have been pursued and have failed, notably cap
and trade. This, as much as anything, supports the notion of a new
policy path, one that recognizes the need for across the board
beneﬁts for all participating nations.
As I have suggested, the incentives for agglomeration of nations
with a hypothetical cap and trade regime are inherently perverse.
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Should a few countries agree to cap and trade, convinced of the
dangers of global warming, they will, if their policies are effective,
delay the consequences of warming, reducing the incentive for other
nations to join them. Further, there will be the constant battle over
harmonizing the allocations of allowed emissions among nations. Tax
harmonization is simple and straightforward and logical. A ton of CO2
causes the same effect whether from the US, China, India, or Nigeria,
and if it becomes clear such emissions do entail dire threats, everyone
should have the same incentive to avoid them.
4.3. If the science becomes overwhelming
One push back I have got when I pose this idea is that if something
is worth doing (energy R&D in this case) we should simply appropriate
money for that purpose. This is ﬁrst a bit naïve, but beyond that, I
would draw a parallel to “use” taxes here. We have many. Take, for
example, gasoline and tire taxes targeted to highway construction and
maintenance. Here, the “use” on point is the service of the atmosphere
and oceans as disposals for CO2.
Carrying the analogy further, essentially what I am proposing
would be similar to using some of the tire taxes to research how to
make highways less pervious to heavy trafﬁc. That seems a very
sensible use for these funds.
Cost effective reduction of energy required for services is as
beneﬁcial as lower cost energy sources and should obviously be
included in any energy research agenda. So, too, should pursuit of
measures to capture CO2 from ﬂue gases or from the atmosphere
and sequester them.
Without going too far into the weeds, I think goals are critical
to any great endeavor, and lowering energy cost is the right goal
here. Among considerations, I am very cognizant of the degree of
difﬁculty in implementing any policy that begins to have a serious
impact on life and economic well being. If such research efforts
developed non carbon energy technologies that were also lower
cost, they would be self implementing. The choice between
economic welfare and environmental harm would be mooted.
The private economic incentive would favor the non carbon
energy choice. The difﬁculty of forcing adoption of low carbon
technologies would be side stepped.
I am explicitly trying to formulate this idea while remaining
agnostic with regard to the science. Still, it is difﬁcult to evade the
concern that science will ultimately buttress warming fears. In any
case, a strategy is better if it is constructed so that it responds well to
this challenge. Here, the tax approach is most beneﬁcial. Should the
need arise, the camel's nose is indeed under the tent, and the correct
action is simply to increase the tax. Such an increase is about as
transparent as public policy can be, rather than hidden like cap and
trade allowance prices, which “just happen.” Given the potential
breath and consequence of such a policy, the more transparent the
policy, the better.
Surely there will be disagreement about the appropriate level of
the tax. Even if the tax rate is low initially, this approach allows
sequential decision-making if changes in the scientiﬁc assessment are
for the worse. A number of future signal events can increase the public
demand for action and support for tax increases. In the meantime,
hopefully, the funded research will have found ways to reduce the cost
of emission avoidance, meaning the higher tax should be lower than it
would otherwise have been. That helps. If, in the unlikely event lower
cost, non GHG energy technology has become available through R&D,
the need for policy starts to vanish: simple economic incentives will
enable the technology over time.
4.4. The carbon tax and the poorest among us
It is almost tautological that around the world people are poor
because they do not have access to energy resources that they can
afford. Thus, a substantial increase in energy R&D directed to the
end of reducing energy cost is a fundamental attack on poverty.
These are potential beneﬁts enjoyed over and above and global
warming gains.
But a more likely outcome is that, while research reduces the
future cost of non GHG energy, it will be more expensive in the
near term. This is undesirable. If GHG taxes are substantially
raised, compliance with the tax coalition for nations with large
numbers of poor will raise their citizens' bar for escaping poverty
even higher. However, if increased revenues greatly exceed the
needs for useful research (as is certain), these vast funds could be
used for a number of purposes: general revenues partially off-
setting existing taxes, or returned to citizens.
Another use, to the point, is to aid nations to implement low
GHG energy technology as poverty needs dictate. This would not
just be economic aid but would in fact be a deal.
The quid quo pro would be for poorer nations to join the
coalition so that high GHG energy sources in these countries will
be appropriately discouraged, but support is provided to imple-
ment low GHG technology and help provide poor citizens access to
energy.
5. Conclusions and policy implications.
The policy approach outlined here begins with an explicit
recognition of the high degree of uncertainty about the rate of
global warming, as evidenced by dissonant results that have
accumulated over the last number of years. That uncertainty
suggests small steps rather than big bang bold steps and also
implies that we have more time than initially thought to ﬁnd ways
to mitigate its impact. The underlying principle here is that it is
better to take some prudent action even if small rather than argue
over grandiose actions that fail to materialize.
The step proposed here, very modest carbon taxes, can be
strategically crafted to strengthen and improve the search for low
cost non GHG energy alternatives achieving dual desirable goals.
This is only a sketch of a plan and a number of things would
have to be worked out. Among them should be a mechanism to
sequester the research and development fund from political
capture through earmarks and other logrolling. The effort I
propose will likely fail if it becomes a “jobs” fund or a politicized
industry subsidy program.
The IIASA Global Energy Assessment is an ambitious and well
done study whose purpose is to identify means to provide world
energy needs over the long termwhile meeting a target of limiting
global warming to 2 1C. That report describes an Energy Technol-
ogy Innovation System that may serve as a blue print for ensuring
appropriate fund development and expenditure. (Grubler et al.,
2012) No doubt one objection, from those strongly convinced of
global warming danger, will be that this approach is insufﬁcient
for the problem at hand and will deﬂect from other efforts like
renewable mandates and cap and trade. They will also argue that
the tax should be much higher (Nordhaus, 2008).
This would be a more cogent objection were other efforts going
well. Further, the proposed effort is modest enough at least
initially that other initiatives could readily be continued.
The hope is that policy makers will see the advantages to the
proposal presented here. It is low cost and therefore low risk; it is
transparent; it builds in incentives for cooperation; it has the
potential for ameliorating poverty; and, its objectives are sup-
ported by those on both sides of the climate change discussion.
Because the approach is incremental, it will avoid the unintended
consequences of other, more grandiose schemes that have sought
to achieve similar goals. (A notable example of this is the ethanol
program in the U.S. which resulted in increased hunger
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worldwide) (Grifﬁn and Soto, 2012). Finally, in the worst case
scenario (or even middle case scenario) where the science
becomes compelling, a mechanism is in place for immediate and
forceful action.
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